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The aim of this paper is to clarify the failure of the Cagan model with perfect foresight and to draw new axes for 
investigation of monetary hyperinflation analysis. Firstly, the paper evaluates the relevancy of the Cagan ad-hoc 
model with perfect foresight as a theoretical framework for investigating hyperinflation processes. We show that 
deficits  can  never  generate  monetary  hyperinflations,  confirming  the  results  of  Buiter  (1987).  The  only 
hyperinflationary  processes  that  can  occur  are  speculative  hyperinflations.  Secondly,  the  paper  assesses 
consistency of hyperinflationary paths with the optimizing behaviour of representative agents within two perfect 
foresight inflationary finance frameworks modelling the use of money as a medium of exchange. In the context 
of a money-in-the-utility framework, the results obtained in the Cagan ad-hoc model with perfect foresight are 
founded and confirmed. This implies restricting the use of the latter model only to speculative hyperinflations 
analysis.  In  the  context  of  a  transaction  costs  based  model,  we  show  that  deficits  can  generate  monetary 
hyperinflations. Moreover, speculative hyperinflations remain possible. This result is in sharp contrast to that of 
the money-in-the-utility framework and implies a demand for money different from the Cagan form. 
 
 






The modelling of hyperinflation starts with the seminal work of Cagan (1956) within the New 
Quantity Theory of Money. In his original contribution Cagan defines hyperinflation as a 
speeding  up  inflation  process  where  the  inflation  rates  exceed  fifty  percent  monthly.  He 
provides the explanation of hyperinflation as being the result of an excessive public budget 
deficit financed by money creation or seigniorage revenues. In this framework relying on the 
specification of an ad-hoc demand for money, hyperinflation is viewed as a pure monetary 
phenomenon where both inflation rates and money growth rates accelerate and explode. This 
model deals with monetary hyperinflation. However, Cagan original modelling with adaptive 
inflation  expectations  doesn’t  succeed  to  produce  monetary  hyperinflations  as  monetary 
growth isn’t modelled yet. Evans and Yarrow (1981) and Bruno and Fischer (1987) complete 
Cagan’s  model  by  modelling  the  money  supply  process  through  the  government  budget 
constraint.  Nevertheless,  Cagan’s  model  approach  is  seriously  challenged  with  the 
introduction of rational expectations when Buiter (1987) shows that the model with perfect 
foresight is unable to produce any hyperinflation. The failure of the Cagan model to generate 
hyperinflations under rational expectations has created some troubles in the literature. Evans 
(1995), for instance, states a strict association between the correct running of the model and 
adaptive  expectations.  Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1990)  or  Walsh  (2003)  present  the  Cagan 
model only under the adaptive expectations assumption. 
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Evans  and  Yarrow  (1981)  and  Bernholz  and  Gersbach  (1992)  find  out  that  the  crucial 
condition for generating hyperinflation is that real money balances should not decrease more 
than inflation increases with high rates of inflation. As Bruno (1989) points out restoring the 
correct  running  of  the model  requires  the  inclusion  of  a  sufficiently  large  friction  in  the 
adjustment of some nominal variable like expected inflation, money holdings or the exchange 
rate. Thus, assuming sufficiently slow adaptive expectations, as in Evans and Yarrow (1981) 
or Bruno and Fischer (1990), learning as in Marcet and Nicolini (2003), a crawling peg rule 
for the exchange rate as in Bruno (1989), or a sufficiently slow adaptive adjustment on the 
money market as in Kiguel (1989) can guarantee the occurrence of monetary hyperinflation in 
the Cagan model. However, even if one can find arguments in favour of the use of adaptive 
expectations during hyperinflationary episodes as Bruno and Fischer (1990) or Cukierman 
(1988) do for instance, it is hard to justify the persistent presence of behaviours involving 
either  systematic  forecast  mistakes  or  maladjustments  that  are  costly  for  the  agents  in  a 
hyperinflationary context. The problem is that perfect foresight and instantaneous adjustment 
on the money market don’t allow Cagan model to highlight monetary hyperinflation. 
 
The challenge of this problem is not only theoretical. There is a large empirical literature on 
hyperinflationary episodes from Cagan (1956), Sargent and Wallace (1973) or Sargent (1977) 
to  Petrovic  and  Vujosevic  (1996),  Choudry  (1998),  Bogetic  et  al  (1999),  Petrovic  and 
Mladenovic (2000), Slavova (2003), or Georgoutsos and Kouretas (2004) among the most 
recent works for instance. Most of these empirical investigations rely on the Cagan model 
with rational expectations and instantaneous money market clearing. This issue could cast 
doubt on hyperinflation empirical studies that have a priori adopted the Cagan framework 
with  perfect  foresight.  Interestingly,  in  most  hyperinflationary  episodes  studied  in  the 
literature Cagan model seems to characterize well the dynamics of hyperinflation. 
 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, we explore the Cagan ad-hoc model with perfect 
foresight to assess its relevancy as a theoretical framework for investigating hyperinflation 
processes. Second, we resort to the more economically satisfactory case when the demand for 
money  is  derived  from  first  principles.  The  aim  is  to  assess  the  consistency  of 
hyperinflationary  paths  with  the  optimizing  behaviour  of  representative  agents  within  a 
perfect foresight inflationary finance framework modelling the use of money as a medium of 
exchange. Therefore, the main objective of the paper is to clarify the failure of the Cagan 
model  with  perfect  foresight  and  to  draw  new  axes  for  investigation  of  monetary 
hyperinflation analysis. 
 
We confirm the results of Buiter about the failure of the Cagan ad-hoc model with perfect 
foresight by showing that deficits can never generate monetary hyperinflations. However, we 
show  that  the  Cagan  ad-hoc  model  can  be  saved  for  the  analysis  of  hyperinflation  as  it 
remains  relevant  to  generate  speculative  hyperinflations  or  hyperinflationary  bubbles, 
hyperinflations not driven by money growth fundamentals. Resorting to first principles in the 
context  of  an  optimizing  model  with  money-in-the-utility-function,  this  paper  brings 
foundations to the Cagan ad-hoc model, founding the Cagan money demand and confirming 
that  deficits  can’t  generate  monetary  hyperinflation.  Moreover,  we  show  that  the  only 
hyperinflation process that can be generated is speculative hyperinflation. In the context of an 
optimizing  model  with  transaction  costs,  we  show  that  deficits  can  generate  monetary 
hyperinflation in a perfect foresight framework. This result is in sharp contrast to that of the 
money-in-the-utility framework in which Buiter  results were founded and confirmed, and 
implies a demand for money different from the Cagan form. This suggests saving the Cagan 
model for the analysis of monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight by removing the   3 
Cagan money demand. Moreover, we show that speculative hyperinflation remains a strong 
possibility. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a distinction of hyperinflationary processes 
between monetary hyperinflations and speculative hyperinflations within the Cagan ad-hoc 
model  and  within  the  first  principles  context  of  optimizing  monetary  models.  This  is 
something new since the optimizing monetary models literature, from Brock (1974, 1975, 
1978), Kingston (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983, 1986) to Vazquez (1998), Barbosa and 
da Cunha (2003) or Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) for instance, implicitly or explicitly always 
deals with speculative hyperinflations. This distinction may help to save the Cagan ad-hoc 
model with perfect foresight for the analysis of speculative hyperinflation and to provide new 
guidance for studying monetary hyperinflation within a perfect foresight framework derived 
from first principles. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the failure of the Cagan ad-hoc model 
with perfect foresight. Section 3 resorts to the first principles in the context of a money-in-the-
utility optimizing model. Section 4 resorts to an alternative way of modelling the role of 




2 The Cagan ad-hoc model paradox 
 
The demand for real cash balances is the fundamental equation of the Cagan approach of 
modelling monetary hyperinflation. During hyperinflations real variables such as the real rate 
of interest and real output may be reasonably treated as constant since all the action involves 
money and prices. Therefore, since the demand for real cash balances depends on the nominal 
interest rate, it will depend only on the expected rate of inflation. The traditional approach 
builds upon an ad-hoc semi-logarithmic demand for real per-capita cash balances
d
t m , known 





g ap - =   .        (1) 
 
In this equation 
e
t p  represents the expected rate of inflation, a and g       are parameters. The role 
of constant g  is assumed to describe the influence of real income and real interest rate, which 
are supposed to be constant in this framework. The positive constant a, the semi-elasticity of 
money  demand,  describes  the  decreasing  demand  for  real  cash  balances  with  respect  to 
expected rate of inflation. 
 




t t p p =  ,          (2) 
 
Where  t p  is the actual rate of inflation. 
 
Instant clearing prevails on the money market: 







º =  .          (3) 
 
where  t M  is per-capita money supply and  t P the general price level. 
 
The process explaining the money supply completes the model. In this kind of inflationary 
finance  model  a  constant  per-capita  share  of  government’s  deficit  t d   is  assumed  to  be 










  .        (4) 
 
As  usual  a  dot  on  a  variable  denotes  its  time  derivative.  Denoting  per-capita  real  cash 
balances by m, equation (4) may be rewritten in the following way: 
 
d m m p = + ￿           (4)’ 
 
 Combining (1) (2) and (3) and omitting time index for simplicity leads to 
 
m e
g ap - =           (5) 
 
 Extracting the expression for p  from the latter equation and substituting it into (4)’ gives, 
after rearranging, the law of motion of real per-capita cash balances for this economy: 
 
( )
1 log m d m m a g
- = + - ￿           (6) 
 
The dynamics of real money balances of this economy are described by the latter autonomous 
differential equation in m and can be conveniently represented in the phase diagram depicted 
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The function given by (6), representing the law of motion of real par-capita money balances, 
is defined for m Î 0, +¥ ] [ and its limits on boundaries are: 
 
0 lim( ) , lim ( )
m m m d m
® ®+¥ = = +¥ ￿ ￿ .        (7) 
The derivative of the function represented by (6) with respect to m and its sign are given by: 
 
( )
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￿ ￿ = - + = = ￿ ￿
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, is strictly positive, the curve m ￿ is strictly convex with a 
minimum at 
1 m e
g - = . The size of the government deficit determines the relative position of 
the phase curve in the diagram: a higher d shifts the curve upwards. Then, the existence of 
steady states depends on the sign of the value of m ￿  at its minimum
1 m e
g - =  
 
   
1 1 1 * ( ) 0 if m e d e d
g g a
- - -
< < ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ = = = ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ > > ￿ ￿
￿
      (9) 
 
Based on these calculations monetary dynamics of this economy can be represented on Figure 
1 which exhibits two well known key aspects of the Cagan ad-hoc model. First, dual steady 
states co-exist for any level of government deficit d below d* (curve 1 m ￿ ) and the absence of 
any steady state for any d above d* (curve 2 m ￿ ). Second, the existence of a high inflation trap 
when the government deficit is not excessive (
* d d < ) since the high-inflation steady state, 
mB, is stable and the low-inflation steady state, mA, is unstable. 
 
These  results come from  the existence  of  a  Laffer  curve for  the  steady  state  seigniorage 
revenues. In the case of the Cagan demand for money the curve representing seigniorage 
revenues is a bell-shaped curve. That’s why it is called a “Laffer curve” for the seigniorage 
revenues. Therefore, there is a maximal level of real deficit, d , consistent with a stationary 
inflation rate, on one hand, and the possibility for the government to finance the same real 
budget deficit with two different stationary inflation rates, one called “low” and the other 
“high”, as long as the real budget deficit remains lower than d , on the other hand. For the 
economy it means that there is the possibility of two different steady-state equilibria, one of 
“low inflation” and the other of “high inflation”. There is duality of steady-state equilibrium 
as long as the budget deficit remains lower than d . 
 
Assessing  d   can  be  done  in  the  following  way.  Calling  R  the  steady-state  amount  of 
seigniorage revenues, the value of d  is the maximal value of R. This value is given by: 
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{ } { }
* 1 1 max ( ) max d R R e e
g ap g
p p p p a
- - - = = = × =   ,      (10)  
 
and is exactly the value d* showed previously: d =d*. The value of the stationary inflation 
rate corresponding to this maximum of seigniorage revenues is then: 
 
{ }









Figure  2  shows  the  “Laffer  curve”  for  the  stationary  seigniorage  revenues.  The  issue  of 
duality of the steady-state equilibrium clearly appears and so does the issue of financing a real 
budget deficit higher than d* like d1 for instance. As can be seen on figure 2, there isn’t any 
possibility to finance such a higher deficit with a stationary inflation rate. Therefore, this 
leaves the place for a non stationary way. In his seminal paper Cagan (1956) proposed the 
explanation  of  monetary  hyperinflation  as  being  the  result  of  an  excessive  public  deficit 
financed through money creation. 
 
Proposition 1: The Cagan ad-hoc model with perfect foresight is unable to neither produce 
nor explain any monetary hyperinflation. 
 
Proof: The curve  2 m ￿ depicted in Figure 1 represents the dynamics of real money balances 
when
* d d > . As the value of  2 m ￿  at its minimum
1 m e
g - =  is strictly positive, according to the 
variations of the function representing  2 m ￿ and its limits on boundaries it is clearly established 
that the curve  2 m ￿  is entirely above the horizontal axis. Then,  2 0 for all 0 m m > > ￿ : the paths 
followed  by  the  economy  when  the  public  deficit  is  excessive  are  paths  of  continuously 
increasing real per-capita money balances associated with continuously decreasing inflation 
rates according to (1). 
Therefore, there aren’t any steady states and an explosive non stationary process takes place. 
However, unlike the standard explanation brought by Cagan (1956) in its seminal paper, this 
explosive process caused by an excessive public deficit is not a monetary hyperinflation but a 
“hyperdeflation”  as  shown  by  Buiter  (1987)  in  a  similar  framework  with  linear  money 
demand and perfect foresight. This is the “hyperdeflation paradox”. 
B p  
A p  
R 
1 d
2 d  
* d  
p    7 
It should be stressed that this model is unable to neither produce nor explain any monetary 
hyperinflation. In the case of a relatively small budget deficit (
* d d < ), the trajectories to the 
left of the low inflation steady state leading to the high inflation steady state should not be 
considered  as  hyperinflation.  Along  these  paths  the  inflation  rates  are  rising  but  are 
converging to a stable one and there is no place for any explosive inflation paths. As Buiter 
(1987)  pointed  out  describing  these  paths  as  hyperinflation  is  “akin to describing  a  mild 
summer breeze as a hurricane”. 
To show this  we use the dynamics of  real money balances  given by (6) to calculate the 
dynamics of the rate of inflation. Substituting the value of p from (5) into (6) leads to the law 
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 at its maximum in 
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) for small deficit case, it 
is easy to see that the transition paths from the low inflation steady state to the high inflation 
steady state start with an accelerating inflation and, after having reached 
1 p a
- = , end up with 
decelerating  inflation  before  reaching  a  stationary  inflation  rate.  Therefore,  no  monetary 
hyperinflation occurs in the model. This completes the proof.￿ 
 
Proposition 2: The only hyperinflation process that the Cagan ad-hoc model with perfect 
foresight may produce is speculative hyperinflation. 
 
Proof: Considering the case of a balanced public budget that is a zero government deficit 
( 0) d = leads to the following degenerated law of motion for real money balances: 
 
( )
1 log m m m a g
- = - ￿ .        (6)’ 
 
The curve  0 m ￿ representing the latter monetary dynamics is depicted in Figure 1. It is easily 
obtained from the properties of the law of motion (6). There is a unique unstable steady state 
(m e
g = ). All the paths starting to the left of the unique steady state lead to a zero level of real 
per-capita cash balances and an infinite rate of inflation and price level. According to (5) and 
(12), along these paths the inflation rate is continuously increasing at a constant rate without 
any  money  supply  growth  since  the  money  stock  is  constant  (see  equation  (4)).  So 
hyperinflation  processes  may  develop  without  any  fundamentals:  these  paths  are  rational 
hyperinflationary bubbles or speculative hyperinflations. This completes the proof.￿ 
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This section established that the ad-hoc model with perfect foresight is seriously flawed for 
the study of monetary hyperinflation according to the “hyperdeflation paradox”, and that it 
might be used only to investigate speculative hyperinflation. These issues give rise to a kind 
of  paradox  since  the  Cagan  model  has  been  originally  designed  to  produce  and  explain 
monetary hyperinflation and not speculative hyperinflation. The Cagan model is an ad-hoc 
model because it is built upon an ad-hoc demand for real per-capita cash balances. In order to 
tell more about these problems it is necessary to look at the economically more satisfactory 
case when the demand for money is derived from first principles. Therefore, the next two 
sections develop two standard optimizing monetary frameworks to model the use of money as 




3 Money in the utility function and Cagan money demand 
 
The  two optimizing monetary models considered in  this paper assume a  continuous time 
model where the economy consists of a large number of identical infinitely-lived forward 
looking households endowed with perfect foresight. Population is constant and its size is 
normalized to unity for convenience. There is no uncertainty. Each household has a non-
produced constant endowment  0 y >  of the non-storable consumption good per unit of time. 
 
In the money-in-the-utility-function model the role of money as a medium of exchange is 
assumed  to  be  captured  by  introducing  real  money  balances  into  the  household  utility 
function. The set up draws on Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1974, 1975, 1978). 
 







t t c m U c m e dt
d
¥




t t t t t c m y m t p + = - - ￿  ,        (15) 
 
where  ( ) , U c m is known as the instantaneous utility function assumed to be increasing and 
concave in both c and m, 
t c is the household’s consumption at time t,  t m is his holdings of real 
monetary balances, d is the rate of time preference,  t p the inflation rate, and  t t is a lump-sum 
tax assumed to be constant. 
 
The first-order conditions for this problem are made up of the following respective Euler 
equation and transversality condition: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) , , , , cc t t t cm t t t m t t c t t t U c m c U c m m U c m U c m p d + = - + + ￿ ￿ ,    (16) 
 
( ) lim , 0
t
c t t t t U c m e m
d -
®¥
￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ .        (17) 
 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market is   9 
 
t y c g = + ,          (18) 
 
where g is the constant government expenditure. We assume that the utility function U is 
additive separable in c and m such that 
 
( ) , ( ) ( ) t t t t U c m u c v m = + ,        (19) 
 
where u is increasing and concave in c, and v is increasing and concave in m. Using (18) and 
(19), and normalizing the constant value of  ( ) c u y g - to unity for convenience, the first-order 
conditions can be re-written as 
 




t t e m
d -
®¥
￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ .          (17)’ 
 
Substituting  the  value  of  p   extracted  from  (5)  into  equation  (16)’  and  then  integrating 
provides microeconomic foundations of the Cagan money demand since we get, similarly as 
Kingston (1982) or Calvo and Leiderman (1992) 
 
( ) ( )
1 1 log for all 0 v m m m m e
g ad a g ad
- + = + + - < < .    (20) 
 
The  latter  expression  of  v  shows  that  Cagan  money  demand  can  be  derived  from  the 
representative household preferences. 
 









t = - = = ×
￿ ￿
.        (21) 
 
Using the latter expression, the definition of real per-capita money balances and the value of 
p  extracted from Euler equation (16)’ we have 
 
( ) ( )
M




¢ = - = - - ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿      (22) 
 
Equation  (22)  provides  a  complete  characterization  of  real  per-capita  money  balances 
dynamics. Using the expression of v given by (20) founding the Cagan money demand we get 
 
( )
1 log for all 0 m d m m m e
g ad a g
- + = + - < < ￿    (23) 
 
which provides exactly the same real money balances dynamic properties as in the Cagan ad-
hoc model with perfect foresight presented in section 2. However, the crucial difference is 
that real per-capita money balances dynamics given by (23) are derived from the optimizing 
behaviour of the representative household described by (14) and (15) and not from an ad-hoc   10 
framework.  Therefore,  we  may  use  conveniently  Figure  1  for  representing  the  different 
dynamic properties of the autonomous differential equation (23). 
 
Proposition 3: (i) All hyperdeflationary paths corresponding to the absence of steady states 
and  an  excessive  government  budget  deficit  (
* d d > )  can  be  ruled  out.  (ii)  All 
hyperdeflationary paths starting to the right of the low inflation steady state in the case of a 
small government deficit (
* 0 d d £ < ) can be ruled out. 
 
Proof: (i) As the qualitative dynamic properties of differential equation (23) are the same as 
those of the one obtained within the Cagan ad-hoc model, we have shown in section 2 that an 
excessive government budget deficit (
* d d > ) will shift the curve describing  m ￿ above the 
horizontal  axis  ( 1 m ￿ ).  Along  the  paths  described  by  curve  1 m ￿ the  real  per-capita  money 
balances are continuously increasing without boundaries (“hyperdeflation” paradox). These 
paths can be easily ruled out because they violate the transversality condition (17)’. Along 
these hyperdeflationary paths lim 0
t
t t e m
d -
®¥
￿ ￿> ￿ ￿  because, whereas as t ® ¥,  0
t e
d - ￿ ￿® ￿ ￿  at the 




￿ ￿= ¥ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
). 
This feature is sufficient to preclude these hyperdeflationary paths because it is not optimal 
for households to follow them. 
(ii) The continuum of paths starting to the right of the low-inflation steady state in the case of 
a small government budget deficit (
* 0 d d £ < ) are hyperdeflationary paths since  0 m > ￿  for all 
A m m > . Therefore, according to the transversality condition (17)’ they can be ruled out. This 
completes the proof.￿ 
 
Proposition 4: In this money-in-the-utility framework: 
(i)  no monetary hyperinflation can be generated, 
(ii)  the  only  hyperinflationary  paths  that  can  be  generated  are  speculative 
hyperinflations. 
 
Proof: As the qualitative dynamic properties of differential equation (23) are the same as 
those  of  the  one  obtained  within  the  Cagan  ad-hoc  model,  Proposition  1  proves  (i)  and 
Proposition 2 proves (ii). It should be stressed that hyperinflationary bubbles paths starting for 
any  m e
g < (occurring in the case of a balanced government budget) are fully consistent with 
the rational behaviour of the representative household and cannot be ruled out as Obstfeld and 
Rogoff  (1983)  have  shown.  In  the  more  general  case  of  the  separable  additive  utility 
function ( , ) ( ) ( ) U c m u c v m = + , it is possible to show from (22), as done by Brock (1978) and 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), that ruling out hyperinflationary bubbles paths would require the 




¢ > .  Scheinkman  (1980)  related  this  condition  to  the 
essentiality of money i.e. the fact that “money is very necessary to the system”. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff  (1983)  showed  that  ruling  out  hyperinflationary  paths  would  impose  severe 
requirements on the preferences since it would require that  ( )
0 lim
m v m
® = -¥ . Therefore, even in 
the general case of  ( , ) ( ) ( ) U c m u c v m = + speculative hyperinflations paths are consistent with 
the rational household behaviour. This completes the proof.￿ 
 
This section establishes that the ad-hoc model with perfect foresight can be derived from a 
money-in-the-utility optimizing framework. Since hyperdeflationary paths are clearly ruled   11 
out  by  violating  the  transversality  condition  the  model  can  only  support  cases  of  small 
government budget deficits (
* d d < ). More importantly, section 3 strongly confirms that the 
Cagan model with perfect foresight cannot be used to investigate monetary hyperinflation and 
that it is only accurate to investigate speculative hyperinflation. Next section, however, shows 
that it is possible to highlight monetary hyperinflation within a perfect foresight optimizing 




4 Transaction costs, demand for money and monetary hyperinflation 
 
In this section the role of money as a medium of exchange is captured explicitly by modelling 
a transaction technology showing that the use of money balances decreases the transaction 
costs. We use a very similar framework as that provided by Vazquez (1998). The transaction 
technology is characterized by the fact that transaction costs increase linearly with the volume 
of consumption, but decrease (at a decreasing rate) with increasing holdings of real per-capita 
money balances. Using a generalization of the transaction costs implied by the Baumol-Tobin 
model  (see  Feenstra,  1986),  these  are  modelled  by  a  multiplicative  separable  transaction 
technology given by 
 
( ) ( ) , t t t t T c m c f m = ,          (24) 
 
where ( ) f m is an isoelastic function such that  ( ) 0 f m ¢ <  and  ( ) 0 f m ¢¢ > . 
 
Since output y and government expenditure g are constants by assumption, the goods market 
equilibrium can be written as 
 
( ) t t t y c c f m g = + + .       (25) 
 
Along  a  hyperinflationary  path  where  inflation  rates  explode  and  real  per-capita  money 
balances vanish, transaction costs must always increase since  ( ) 0 f m ¢¢ > and T is a linear 
function in c. Then, according to goods market equilibrium condition (25), an upper bound 
T for transaction costs must be considered as private resources are limited and per-capita 
consumption  is  non  negative.  This  upper  bound  T for  transaction  costs  represents  the 
threshold at which representative households may switch to a system of barter in order to 
avoid the excessive costs of transactions involving the use of money. T is defined by the level 
of transaction costs such that the households are indifferent between trading involving the use 
of money and barter trading because the two systems provide the same amount of per-capita 
consumption c . 
 
Representing the level of real per-capita money balances associated with the upper bound of 
transaction costs T  by  m and using goods market equilibrium condition (25), the following 
relationship can be established 
 
1 y g c
m f
c
- - - ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
.         (26) 
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We use the same notations as in section 3. The representative household, knowing the lower 
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( ) t t t t t t m y c c f m m t p = - - - - ￿ ,        (28) 
 
t c c ³ .           (29) 
 
This is a dynamic optimization problem with a bounded control. The solution to this problem 
is  obtained  (Kamien  and  Schwartz,  1991)  by  setting  the  Lagrangian  which  is  built  by 
appending the feasibility constraint (29) to the Hamiltonian 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
t t t t t t t t t H e u c y c c f m m c c
d l t p m
- ￿ ￿ = + - - - - + - ￿ ￿  (30) 
 
where  t m is the Lagrangian multiplier. Assuming a logarithmic utility function  ( ) log u c c = , 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are 
 
( ) ( )
1




l m - + + = ,        (31) 
 
( ) ( ) t t t t t c f m l l d p ¢ = + + ￿ ,        (32) 
 








￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ .          (34) 
 
By denoting  t the time when per-capita consumption reaches the lower bound c , that is, the 
economy switches to a barter system, we have from (33) and (31) 
 
( ) ( ) 1 for t t t t c c f m t t l + = <       (35) 
 
Moreover, from the goods equilibrium condition (25) we have 
 
( ) t t t c c f m y g + = - .       (25)’ 
 
 
Substituting (25)’ into (35) we get 
 
( ) 1 for t y g t t l - = < .        (35)’   13 
 
Since y and g are constants, the latter implies that the co-state variable t l is also a constant. 
Therefore, we have from (32) 
 
( ) ( ) 0 t t t c f m l d p ¢ = + + .        (36) 
 















.        (37) 
 
The  latter  condition  shows  a  relationship  between  inflation  and  real  per-capita  money 
balances as in Cagan’s model. 
 
Proposition 5: The current framework of transaction technology micro-modelling provides 
through equation (37) new micro-foundations for the demand for money in which real per-
capita money balances and inflation are inversely related as in Cagan’s model. 
 
Proof: Condition (37) establishes a relationship between real per-capita money balances and 
inflation. Let us introduce function  ( ) ( )







. The first derivative of the function 
Y is  given  by ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






f m m f m f m f m
m
mf m f m
y
¢ ¢ - +
¢ = >
+
.  This  establishes  that  the 
functionY is strictly increasing in m. 
From (37) ( ) ( ) m l d p Y = - + , and since functionY is strictly increasing in m we can write 
( ) ( )
1 m l d p
- = Y - + implying an inverse relationship between m and p . This completes the 
proof.￿ 
 
As  in  section  3,  we  assume  that  the  constant  per  capita  government  budget  deficit  d  is 








t = - = = ×
￿ ￿
.           
 
Using the latter expression, the definition of real per-capita money balances and the value of 
p  extracted from equation (37) we have, omitting time index t, 
 
( )
( ) ( ) 1
mf m M





= - = + + ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿
￿
￿       (38) 
 
Equation  (38)  provides  a  complete  characterization  of  real  per-capita  money  balances 
dynamics before c is reached when t t < . 
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= - , and  ( ) lim
m m m e e
® = . The 
following proposition shows that the current optimizing framework is appropriate to highlight 
both monetary hyperinflations and speculative hyperinflations. 
 
Proposition 6: In this transaction costs optimizing framework: 
if  d T m e d < - ,  then  (i)  monetary  hyperinflation  paths  exist,  and  (ii)  speculative 
hyperinflation paths exist. 
 
Proof: Proving the proposition requires three steps: firstly showing that the curve m ￿ is always 
increasing  in  m,  secondly  the  condition  for lim 0
m mm
® < ￿ ,  thirdly  identifying  and  showing 
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), implying  that  ( )
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gives 
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Rearranging this can be rewritten in the following way 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) lim
m m
cf m mf m T
m d m d m




= + + × = + + × -
+ +
￿  
Using (35) the latter simplifies in  lim
m mm d m T d e





®¥ = +¥ ￿ the curve representing  m ￿ is increasing and crossing the horizontal axis only 
once at the unique steady state 
* m m > . 
All paths originating at the right of m* are hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out 
because violating the transversality condition given by (34). 
When the government runs a positive fiscal deficit,  0 d > , all paths starting at the left of m* 
are  hyperinflationary  paths  since  the  level  of  per-capita  money  balances  decreases 
continuously as time goes by, and thus, according to proposition 5, the inflation rate explodes. 
Moreover,  these  hyperinflationary  paths are monetary hyperinflations because along these 
paths the rate of growth of the money supply explodes as well. Rewriting government budget 





,            (21)’   15 
we see that along these paths of continuously declining m, given that  0, d > the growth rate of 
money supply increases continuously. This proves (i). 
When the government budget is balanced,  0, d = the condition d T m e d < - still holds and the 
same  kind  of  monetary  dynamics  appear  as  with  the  case  0 d > .  However,  in  this  case, 
hyperinflation  paths  originating  at  the  left  of  m*  are  not  monetary  hyperinflations  but 
speculative hyperinflations since, according to  (21), the stock of money is  constant. This 





Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic properties of differential equation (38). Along a monetary 
hyperinflation  path,  once  the  economy  reaches  m   real  money  balances  vanish  and  the 
economy switches to a barter trading system. Then, the government can no longer finance its 
deficit by money creation. 
 
In  the  case  d T m e d > - ,  we  have lim 0
m mm
® > ￿ and,  from  there,  an  increasing  curve 
describingm ￿ . A continuum of hyperdeflationary paths would occur at the right of m and there 
wouldn’t be no steady state. These hyperdeflationary paths can be ruled out by violating the 
transversality  condition  (34).  This  implies  that  the  model  is  valid  only  for  the  case 
d T m e d < - . 
 
Proposition 6 is important because it establishes that a perfect foresight optimizing monetary 
model is able to produce monetary hyperinflation and not only speculative hyperinflation. 
This  result  has  been  obtained  without  any  ad-hoc  assumption  implying  the  inclusion  of 
friction in the adjustment of some nominal variable. Therefore, it suggests that monetary 
hyperinflation paths are consistent with the optimizing behaviour of representative households 
in an optimizing monetary framework where money is desired for its role as a medium of 
exchange. The transaction costs modelling approach may give an alternative to the standard 





m ￿  
m 
m 
* m  
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The  Cagan  ad-hoc  model  has  been  designed  to  explain  monetary  hyperinflation, 
hyperinflation  driven  by  money  growth  acceleration  in  the  context  of  an  excessive 
government budget deficit. In this paper, we confirm the results of Buiter (1987) establishing 
that in the Cagan ad-hoc model with perfect foresight deficits can never generate monetary 
hyperinflations. On the contrary, hyperdeflationary paths may get under way when deficits are 
excessive  (Buiter  hyperdeflation  paradox).  Moreover,  we  show  that  no  monetary 
hyperinflation can be generated in this framework. Therefore, the Cagan ad-hoc model with 
perfect  foresight  is  seriously  flawed  for  the  investigation  of  monetary  hyperinflation. 
However, we show that this framework can be saved for the analysis of hyperinflationary 
processes because it can generate speculative hyperinflations or hyperinflationary bubbles in 
the context of a balanced government budget where there is no money growth. 
 
This paper resorts to first principles to clarify the failure of the Cagan ad-hoc model and to 
assess  the  consistency  of  hyperinflationary  paths  with  the  optimizing  behaviour  of 
representative agents. We consider two standard optimizing monetary frameworks to model 
the  use  of  money  in  a  context  where  money  growth  relies  on  the  government  need  for 
seigniorage revenues: a money-in-the-utility model and a transactions costs based model. In 
the  context  of  a  money-in-the-utility  model  we  show  that  the  Cagan  ad-hoc  model  with 
perfect  foresight  can  be  derived  from  first  principles  by  specifying  appropriate  agents 
preferences. We obtain the same qualitative dynamic properties as in the Cagan ad-hoc model 
with perfect foresight. The optimizing behaviour of the representative agents allows ruling out 
all  hyperdeflationary  paths  as  non  optimal  paths.  In  this  model  we  show  that  monetary 
hyperinflations  can’t  be  generated.  Moreover,  we  show  that  the  only  hyperinflationary 
processes that can be generated are speculative hyperinflations consistent  with the agents 
optimizing behaviour. Therefore, the money-in-the-utility framework strongly confirms that 
the Cagan model with perfect foresight cannot be used to investigate monetary hyperinflation 
and that it is only accurate to investigate speculative hyperinflation. 
 
In  the  context  of  an  optimizing  model  with  transaction  costs,  we  show  that  deficits  can 
generate  monetary  hyperinflations  in  a  perfect  foresight  framework  and  speculative 
hyperinflations remain a strong possibility in the context of a balanced government budget. 
This result is in sharp contrast to that of the money-in-the-utility framework in which Buiter 
results  were  founded  and  confirmed.  It  implies  a  demand  for  real  cash  balances  strictly 
decreasing with respect to the inflation rate but different from the Cagan money demand. 
Hence,  monetary  hyperinflation  paths  are  consistent  with  the  optimizing  behaviour  of 
representative households in an optimizing monetary framework where money is desired for 
its role as a medium of exchange. The transaction costs modelling approach may give an 
alternative to the standard Cagan’s model failing with perfect foresight. This result emerges 
without any ad-hoc assumption implying the inclusion of friction in the adjustment of some 
nominal variable and suggests that monetary hyperinflation analysis with perfect foresight 





Bernholz  P.  and  Gersbach  H.  [1992],  «The Present  Monetary  Theory  of Advanced  Inflation:  a  Failure  ?», 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 148 (4), pp. 705-719. 
Blanchard O.J. and S. Fischer [1989], Lectures on Macroeconomics, Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
Bogetic  Z.,  P.  Petrovic  and  Z.  Vujosevic  [1999],  «The  Yugoslav  Hyperinflation  of  1992-1994:  Causes, 
Dynamics, and Money Supply Process», Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, pp. 335-353.   17 
Brock  W. [1974],  «Money and Growth: the Case of  Long Run Perfect Foresight», International Economic 
Review, 15, no. 3, pp. 750-777. 
Brock W. [1975], «A Simple Perfect Foresight Monetary Model», Journal of Monetary Economics, 1, pp. 133-
150. 
Brock W. [1978], «A Note on Hyperinflationary Equilibria in Long Run Perfect Foresight Monetary Models : a 
Correction», Mimeographed, University of Chicago. 
Bruno M. [1989], «Econometrics and the Design of Economic Reform», Econometrica, 57, 2, pp. 275-306. 
Bruno M. and S. Fischer [1987], «Seigniorage Operating Rules and the High Inflation Trap», NBER Working 
Paper. 
Bruno M. and S. Fischer [1990], «Seigniorage Operating Rules and the High Inflation Trap», The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 353-374. 
Buiter  W.  [1987],  «A  Fiscal  Theory  of  Hyperdeflations?  Some  Surprising  Monetarist  Arithmetic»,  Oxford 
Economic Papers, 39, pp. 111-118. 
Cagan P. [1956], «The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation», in M. Friedman (Ed), Studies in the Quantity 
Theory of Money, Chicago, pp. 25-117. 
Calvo G. and L. Leiderman [1992],  «Optimal Inflation Tax under Pre-commitment: Theory and Evidence», 
American Economic Review, 82, pp. 174-194. 
Choudhry T. [1998], «Another Visit to the Cagan Model of Money Demand: the Latest Russian Experience», 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 17, pp. 355-376. 
Cukierman A. [1988], «Rapid Inflation: Deliberate Policy or Miscalculation», Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, K. Brunner et A.H. Meltze (eds.), vol. 27, Amsterdam, North Holland, pp. 11-76. 
Evans J.L. [1995], «The Demand for Money: Hyperinflation or High Inflation Traps», The Manchester School 
Supplement, pp. 40-56. 
Evans J. and G. Yarrow [1981], «Some Implications of Alternative Expectations Hypotheses in the Monetary 
Analysis of Hyperinflations», Oxford Economic Papers, 33, pp. 61-80. 
Feenstra R. [1986], «Functional Equivalence between Liquidity Costs and the Utility of Money», Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 17, pp.271-291. 
Georgoutsos  D.A.  and  G.P.  Kouretas  [2004],  «A  Multivariate  I  (2)  Cointegration  Analysis  of  German 
Hyperinflation», Applied Financial Economics, 14, pp. 29-41. 
Gutierrez M.J. and Vazquez J. [2004], «Explosive Hyperinflation, Inflation Tax Laffer Curve and Modelling the 
Use of Money», Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160, pp. 311-338. 
Kamien M. and Schwartz N. [1991], Dynamic Optimization, North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Kiguel  M.  [1989],  «Budgets  Deficits,  Stability  and  the  Monetary  Dynamics  of  Hyperinflation»,  Journal  of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 21, pp. 148-157. 
Kingston G.H. [1982], «The Semi-log Portfolio Balance Schedule is Tenuous», Journal of Monetary Economics  
9, pp. 389-399. 
Marcet A. and Nicolini J.P. [2003], «Recurrent Hyperinflation and Learning», American Economic Review, 93, 
pp. 1476-1498. 
Obstfeld M. and K. Rogoff [1983], «Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them 
Out», Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp. 675-687. 
Obstfeld  M.  and  K.  Rogoff  [1986],  «Ruling  Out  Divergent  Speculative  Bubbles»,  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics, 91, pp. 349-362. 
Petrovic  P.  and  Z.  Mladenovic  [2000],  «Money  Demand  and  Exchange  Rate  Determination  under 
Hyperinflation: Conceptual Issues and Evidence from Yugoslavia», Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
32, pp. 785-806. 
Petrovic P. and Z. Vujosevic [1996], «The Monetary Dynamics in the Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1991-1993: 
the Cagan Money Demand», European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 467-483. 
Sargent  T.  [1977],  «The  Demand  for  Money  During  Hyperinflations  Under  Rational  Expectations  I», 
International Economic Review, 18, no. 1, pp. 59-82. 
Sargent T. et Wallace N. [1973], «Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation», International 
Economic Review, 14, no. 2, pp. 328-350. 
Scheinkman J. [1980], «Discussion», in Kareken J. and Wallace N. (eds.), Models of Monetary Economies, 
Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pp. 91-96. 
Sidrauski M. [1967], «Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary Economy», American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings, 57, pp. 534-544. 
Slavova S. [2003], «Money Demand During Hyperinflation and Stabilization: Bulgaria, 1991-2000», Applied 
Economics, 35, pp.1303-1316. 
Vazquez  J. [1998],  «How  High  Can Inflation  Get  During  Hyperinflation?  A Transaction Cost  Demand  for 
Money Approach», European Journal of Political Economy, 14, pp. 433-451. 
Walsh C.E. [2003], Monetary Theory and Policy, Second Edition, Cambridge, The MIT Press. 1 
 
 






2000–01  Hétérogénéité de travailleurs, dualisme et salaire d’efficience. 
  Francesco DE PALMA, janvier 2000. 
 
2000–02  An Algebraic Index Theorem for Non–smooth Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, janvier 2000. 
 
2000–03  Wage Indexation, Central Bank Independence and the Cost of  Disinflation. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, janvier 2000. 
 
2000–04  Une analyse cognitive du concept de « vision entrepreneuriale ». 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Babak MEHMANPAZIR, février 2000. 
 
2000–05  Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, mars 2000. 
 
2000–06  Sunspots and Incomplete Markets with Real Assets. 
  Nadjette LAGUÉCIR, avril 2000. 
 
2000–07  Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors : A Survey. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, mai 2000. 
 
2000–08  Knowledge and Expertise : Toward a Cognitive and Organisational Duality of the Firm. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Olivier DUPOUËT, Francis KERN, Francis MUNIER, mai 2000. 
 
2000–09  Tie–breaking Rules and Informational Cascades : A Note. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, juin 2000. 
 
2000–10  SPQR : the Four Approaches to Origin–Destination Matrix Estimation for  Consideration by 
the MYSTIC Research Consortium. 
  Marc GAUDRY, juillet 2000. 
 
2000–11  SNUS–2.5, a Multimoment Analysis of Road Demand, Accidents and their Severity in 
Germany, 1968–1989. 
  Ulrich BLUM, Marc GAUDRY, juillet 2000. 
 
2000–12  On the Inconsistency of the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator for Spatial Autoregressive 
Processes. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Agénor LAHATTE, septembre 2000. 
 
2000–13  Turning Box–Cox including Quadratic Forms in Regression. 
  Marc GAUDRY, Ulrich BLUM, Tran LIEM, septembre 2000. 
 
2000–14  Pour une approche dialogique du rôle de l’entrepreneur/managerdans l’évolution des PME : 
l’ISO comme révélateur ... 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Blandine LANOUX, septembre 2000. 
 
2000–15  Diversity of innovative strategy as a source of technological performance. 
Patrick LLERENA, Vanessa OLTRA, octobre 2000. 
 
2000–16  Can we consider the policy instruments as  cyclical  substitutes ? 
  Sylvie DUCHASSAING,  Laurent GAGNOL, décembre 2000. 2 
 
 
2001–01  Economic growth and CO2 emissions : a nonparametric approach. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Phu NGUYEN VAN, janvier 2001. 
 
2001–02  Distributions supporting the first–order approach to principal–agent problems. 
  Sandrine SPÆTER, février 2001. 
 
2001–03  Développement durable et Rapports Nord–Sud dans un Modèle à Générations Imbriquées : 
interroger le futur pour éclairer le présent. 
  Alban VERCHÈRE, février 2001. 
 
2001–04  Modeling Behavioral Heterogeneity in Demand Theory. 
  Isabelle MARET, mars 2001. 
 
2001–05  Efficient estimation of spatial autoregressive models. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, mars 2001. 
 
2001–06  Un modèle de stratégie individuelle de primo–insertion professionnelle. 
  Guy TCHIBOZO, mars 2001. 
 
2001–07  Endogenous Fluctuations and Public Services in a Simple OLG Economy. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, avril 2001. 
 
2001–08  Behavioral Heterogeneity in Large Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, avril 2001. 
 
2001–09  GMM Estimation of Lattice Models Using Panel Data : Application. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, avril 2001. 
 
2001–10  Dépendance spatiale sur données de panel : application à la relation Brevets–R&D au 
niveau régional. 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, avril 2001. 
 
2001–11  Impact économique régional d'un pôle universitaire : application au cas strasbourgeois.  
  Laurent GAGNOL, Jean–Alain HÉRAUD, mai 2001. 
 
2001–12  Diversity of innovative strategy as a source of technological performance. 
  Patrick LLERENA, Vanessa OLTRA, mai 2001. 
 
2001–13  La capacité d’innovation dans les regions de l’Union Européenne. 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, juin 2001. 
 
2001–14  Persuasion Games with Higher Order Uncertainty. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, juin 2001. 
 
2001–15  Analyse empirique des fonctions de production de Bosnie–Herzégovine sur la période 
1952–1989. 
  Rabija SOMUN, juillet 2001. 
 
2001–16  The Performance of German Firms in the Business–Related Service Sectors : a Dynamic 
Analysis. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, Ulrich KAISER, François LAISNEY, juillet 2001. 
 
2001–17  Why Central Bank Independence is high and Wage indexation is low. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, septembre  2001. 
 
2001–18  Le mélange des ethnies dans les PME camerounaises  : l’émergence d’un modèle 
d’organisation du travail. 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, octobre 2001. 3 
 
 
2001–19  Les déterminants de la GRH des PME camerounaises. 
  Raphaël NK AKLEU, octobre 2001. 
 
2001–20  Profils d’identité des dirigeants et stratégies de financement dans les PME camerounaises. 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, octobre 2001. 
 
2001–21  Concurrence Imparfaite, Variabilité du Taux de Marge et Fluctuations Endogènes. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, novembre 2001. 
 
2001–22  Determinants of Environmental and Economic Performance of Firms : An Empirical Analysis 
of the European Paper Industry. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Phu NGUYEN VAN et Marcus WAGNER, novembre 2001. 
 
2001–23  The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries. 
  Laurent GAGNOL et Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, décembre 2001. 
 
2001–24  Restrictions on the Autoregressive Parameters of Share Systems with Spatial Dependence. 
  Agénor LAHATTE, décembre 2001. 
 
2002–01  Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games :  A General Model. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–02  Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games :  Applications. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–03  Partial Certifiability and Information Precision in a Cournot Game. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–04  Behavioral Heterogeneity in Large Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, janvier 2002. 
  (Version remaniée du Document de Travail n°2001–08, avril 2001). 
 
2002–05  Modeling Behavioral Heterogeneity in Demand Theory. 
  Isabelle MARET, janvier 2002. 
  (Version remaniée du Document de Travail n°2001–04, mars 2001). 
 
2002–06  Déforestation, croissance économique et population : une étude sur données de panel. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, Théophile AZOMAHOU, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–07  Theories of behavior in principal–agent relationships with hidden action. 
  Claudia KESER, Marc WILLINGER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–08  Principe de précaution et comportements préventifs des firmes face aux risques 
environnementaux. 
  Sandrine SPÆTER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–09  Endogenous Population and Environmental Quality. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–10  Dualité cognitive et organisationnelle de la firme au travers du concept de communauté. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Olivier DUPOUËT, Francis KERN, Francis MUNIER, février 2002. 
 
2002–11  Comment évaluer l’amélioration du bien–être individuel issue d’une modification de la qualité 
du service d’élimination des déchets ménagers ? 





2002–12  The Favorite–Longshot Bias in Sequential Parimutuel Betting with Non–Expected Utility 
Players. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, Marie–Hélène BROIHANNE, février 2002. 
 
2002–13  La sensibilité aux conditions initiales dans les processus individuels de primo–insertion 
professionnelle : critère et enjeux. 
  Guy TCHIBOZO, février 2002. 
 
2002–14  Improving the Prevention of Environmental Risks with Convertible Bonds. 
  André SCHMITT, Sandrine SPÆTER, mai 2002. 
 
2002–15  L’altruisme intergénérationnel comme fondement commun de la courbe environnementale à 
la Kuznets et du développement durable. 
  Alban VERCHÈRE, mai 2002. 
 
2002–16  Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de 
l’eau. 
  Sandrine SPÆTER, Alban VERCHÈRE, juin 2002. 
 
2002–17  Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, juin 2002. 
 
2002–18  Pollution as a source of endogenous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality in OLG 
economies. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, Alban VERCHÈRE, juin 2002. 
 
2002–19  La demande de grosses coupures et l’économie souterraine. 
  Gilbert KŒNIG, juillet 2002. 
 
2002–20  Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments with Externality Among Polluters : An 
Experimental Study. 
  François COCHARD, Marc WILLINGER, Anastasios XEPAPADEAS, juillet 2002. 
 
2002–21  Taille optimale dans l’industrie du séchage du bois et avantage compétitif du bois–énergie : 
une modélisation microéconomique. 
  Alexandre SOKIC, octobre 2002. 
 
2002–22  Modelling Behavioral Heterogeneity. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, novembre 2002. 
 
2002–23  Le changement organisationnel en PME : quels acteurs pour quels apprentissages ? 
  Blandine LANOUX, novembre 2002. 
 
2002–24  TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND COOPERATION : An analytical framework for a paradigmatic 
approach. 
  Patrick LLERENA, Mireille MATT, novembre 2002. 
 
2003–01  Peut–on parler de délégation dans les PME camerounaises ? 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, mars 2003. 
 
2003–02  L’identité organisationnelle et création du capital social  : la tontine d’entreprise comme 
facteur déclenchant dans le contexte africain. 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, avril 2003. 
 
2003–03  A semiparametric analysis of determinants of protected area. 





2003–04  Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete Markets. 
  Gaël GIRAUD et Sonia WEYERS, avril 2003. 
 
2003–05  Exact Homothetic or Cobb–Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation. 
  Gaël GIRAUD et John K.–H. QUAH, juin 2003. 
 
2003–06  Relativité de la satisfaction dans la vie : une étude sur données de panel. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Phu NGUYEN VAN, Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, juin 2003. 
 
2003–07  A model of the anchoring effect in dichotomous choice valuation with follow–up. 
  Sandra LECHNER, Anne ROZAN, François LAISNEY, juillet 2003. 
 
2003–08  Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, juillet 2003. 
 
2003–09  Patents versus ex–post rewards : a new look. 
  Julien PÉNIN, juillet 2003. 
 
2003–10  Endogenous Spillovers under Cournot Rivalry and Co–opetitive Behaviors. 
  Isabelle MARET, août 2003. 
 
2003–11  Les propriétés incitatives de l’effet Saint Matthieu dans la compétition académique. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, septembre 2003. 
 
2003–12  The ‘probleme of problem choice’  : A model of sequential knowledge production within 
scientific communities. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Jean–Michel DALLE, septembre 2003. 
 
2003–13  Distribution Dynamics of CO2 Emissions. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, décembre 2003. 
 
2004–01  Utilité relative, politique publique et croissance économique. 
  Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, janvier 2004. 
 
2004–02  Le management des grands projets de haute technologie vu au travers de la coordination 
des compétences. 
  Christophe BELLEVAL, janvier 2004. 
 
2004–03  Pour une approche dialogique du rôle de l’entrepreneur/manager dans l’évolution des PME : 
l’ISO comme révélateur … 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Blandine LANOUX, février 2004. 
 
2004–04  Consistent Collusion–Proofness and Correlation in Exchange Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Céline ROCHON, février 2004. 
 
2004–05  Generic Efficiency and Collusion–Proofness in Exchange Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Céline ROCHON, février 2004. 
 
2004–06  Dualité cognitive et organisationnelle de la firme fondée sur les interactions entre les 
communautés épistémiques et les communautés de pratique.. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Olivier DUPOUËT, Francis KERN, Francis MUNIER, février 2004. 
 
2004–07  Les Portails d’entreprise  : une réponse aux dimensions de l’entreprise «  processeur de 
connaissances ». 





2004–08  Cumulative Causation and Evolutionary Micro–Founded Technical Change  : A Growth 
Model with Integrated Economies. 
  Patrick LLERENA, André LORENTZ, février 2004. 
 
2004–09  Les CIFRE : un outil de médiation entre les laboratoires de recherche universitaire et les 
entreprises. 
  Rachel LÉVY, avril 2004. 
 
2004–10  On Taxation Pass–Through for a Monopoly Firm. 
  Rabah AMIR, Isabelle MARET, Michael TROGE, mai 2004. 
 
2004–11  Wealth distribution, endogenous fiscal policy and growth : status–seeking implications. 
  Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, juin 2004. 
 
2004–12  Semiparametric Analysis of the Regional Convergence Process. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, Phu NGUYEN VAN, Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, 
 Juillet  2004. 
 
2004–13  Les hypothèses de rationalité de l’économie évolutionniste. 
  Morad DIANI, septembre 2004. 
 
2004–14  Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks. 
  André SCHMITT, Sandrine SPAETER, septembre 2004. 
 
2004–15  Altruisme intergénérationnel, développement durable et équité intergénérationnelle en 
présence d’agents hétérogènes. 
  Alban VERCHÈRE, octobre 2004. 
 
2004–16  Du paradoxe libéral–parétien à un concept de métaclassement des préférences. 
  Herrade IGERSHEIM, novembre 2004. 
 
2004–17  Why do Academic Scientists Engage in Interdisciplinary Research ? 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Thuc Uyen NGUYEN THI, décembre 2004. 
 
2005–01  Les collaborations Université Entreprises dans une perspective organisationnelle et 
cognitive. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Francis KERN, Véronique SCHAEFFER, janvier 2005. 
 
2005–02  The Exact Insensitivity of Market Budget Shares and the ‘Balancing Effect’. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, janvier 2005. 
 
2005–03  Les modèles de type Mundell–Fleming revisités. 
  Gilbert KOENIG, janvier 2005. 
 
2005–04  L’État et la cellule familiale sont–ils substituables dans la prise en charge du chômage en 
Europe ? Une comparaison basée sur le panel européen. 
  Olivia ECKERT–JAFFE, Isabelle TERRAZ, mars 2005. 
 
2005–05  Environment in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Endogenous Labor Supply : a 
Dynamic Analysis. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, Alban VERCHÈRE, mars 2005. 
 
2005–06  Is Monetary Union Necessarily Counterproductive ? 
  Giuseppe DIANA, Blandine ZIMMER, mars 2005. 
 
2005–07  Factors Affecting University–Industry R&D Collaboration : The importance of screening and 
signalling. 
  Roberto FONTANA, Aldo GEUNA, Mireille MATT, avril 2005. 7 
 
 
2005–08  Madison–Strasbourg, une analyse comparative de l’enseignement supérieur et de la 
recherche en France et aux États–Unis à travers l’exemple de deux campus. 
  Laurent BUISSON, mai 2005. 
 
 2005–09  Coordination des négociations salariales en UEM : un rôle majeur pour la BCE. 
  Blandine ZIMMER, mai 2005. 
 
2005–10  Open knowledge disclosure, incomplete information and collective innovations. 
  Julien PÉNIN, mai 2005. 
 
2005–11  Science–Technology–Industry Links and the ‘European Paradox’ : Some Notes on the 
Dynamics of Scientific and Technological Research in Europe. 
  Giovanni DOSI, Patrick LLERENA, Mauro SYLOS LABINI, juillet 2005. 
 
2005–12  Hedging Strategies and the Financing of the 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund. 
  André SCHMITT, Sandrine SPAETER, novembre 2005. 
 
2005–13  Faire émerger la coopération internationale  : une approche expérimentale comparée du 
bilatéralisme et du multilatéralisme. 
  Stéphane BERTRAND, Kene BOUN MY, Alban VERCHÈRE, novembre 2005. 
 
2005–14  Segregation in Networks. 
  Giorgio FAGIOLO, Marco VALENTE, Nicolaas J. VRIEND, décembre 2005. 
 
2006–01  Demand and Technology Determinants of Structural Change and Tertiarisation : An Input–
Output Structural Decomposition Analysis for four OECD Countries. 
  Maria SAVONA, André LORENTZ, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–02  A strategic model of complex networks formation. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Pascale ROUX, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–03  Coordination failures in network formation. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Pascale ROUX, Murat YILDIZOGLU, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–04  Real Options Theory for Lawmaking. 
  Marie OBIDZINSKI, Bruno DEFFAINS, août 2006. 
 
2006–05  Ressources, compétences et stratégie de la firme : Une discussion de l’opposition entre la 
vision Porterienne et la vision fondée sur les compétences. 
  Fernand AMESSE, Arman AVADIKYAN, Patrick COHENDET, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–06  Knowledge Integration and Network Formation. 
  Müge OZMAN, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–07  Networks and Innovation : A Survey of Empirical Literature. 
  Müge OZMAN, février 2006. 
 
2006–08  A.K. Sen et J.E. Roemer : une même approche de la responsabilité ? 
  Herrade IGERSHEIM, mars 2006. 
 
2006–09  Efficiency and coordination of fiscal policy in open economies. 
  Gilbert KOENIG, Irem ZEYNELOGLU, avril 2006. 
 
2006–10  Partial Likelihood Estimation of a Cox Model With Random Effects : an EM Algorithm Based 
on Penalized Likelihood. 




2006–11  Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process. 
 Giuseppe  DARI–MATTIACCI,  Bruno DEFFAINS, avril 2006. 
 
2006–12  Customary versus Technological Advancement Tests. 
  Bruno DEFFAINS, Dominique DEMOUGIN, avril 2006. 
 
2006–13  Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup. 
  Bruno DEFFAINS, Dominique DEMOUGIN, avril 2006. 
 
2006–14  How does leadership support the activity of communities of practice ? 
  Paul MULLER, avril 2006. 
 
2006–15  Do academic laboratories correspond to scientific communities ? Evidence from a large 
European university. 
  Rachel LÉVY, Paul MULLER, mai 2006. 
 
2006–16  Knowledge flows and the geography of networks. A strategic model of small worlds 
formation. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Pascale ROUX, mai 2006. 
 
2006–17  A Further Look into the Demography–based GDP Forecasting Method. 
  Tapas K. MISHRA, juin 2006. 
 
2006–18  A regional typology of innovation capacities in new member states and candidate countries. 
  Emmanuel MULLER, Arlette JAPPE, Jean–Alain HÉRAUD, Andrea ZENKER, juillet 2006. 
 
2006–19  Convergence des contributions aux inégalités de richesse dans le développement des pays 
européens. 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, Rabiji SOMUN–KAPETANOVIC, septembre 2006. 
 
2006–20  Channel Performance and Incentives for Retail Cost Misrepresentation. 
  Rabah AMIR, Thierry LEIBER, Isabelle MARET, septembre 2006. 
 
2006–21  Entrepreneurship in biotechnology  : The case of four start–ups in the Upper–Rhine 
Biovalley. 
  Antoine BURETH, Julien PÉNIN, Sandrine WOLFF, septembre 2006. 
 
2006–22  Does Model Uncertainty Lead to Less Central Bank Transparency ? 
  Li QIN, Elefterios SPYROMITROS, Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–23 Enveloppe  Soleau et droit de possession antérieure : Définition et analyse économique. 
  Julien PÉNIN, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–24  Le territoire français en tant que Système Régional d’Innovation. 
  Rachel LEVY, Raymond WOESSNER, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–25  Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union Under Alternative Labour–Market Structures. 
  Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, Eleftherios SPYROMITROS, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–26  Robust Control and Monetary Policy Delegation. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–27  A study of science–industry collaborative patterns in a large european university. 
  Rachel LEVY, Pascale ROUX, Sandrine WOLFF, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–28  Option chain and change management : a structural equation application. 





2006–29  Prevention and Compensation of Muddy Flows : Some Economic Insights. 
   Sandrine SPAETER, François COCHARD, Anne ROZAN, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–30  Misreporting, Retroactive Audit and Redistribution. 
  Sandrine SPAETER, Marc WILLINGER, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–31  Justifying the Origin of Real Options and their Difficult Evaluation in Strategic Management. 
  Thierry BURGER–HELMCHEN, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–32  Job mobility in Portugal : a Bayesian study with matched worker–firm data. 
  Guillaume HORNY, Rute MENDES, Gerard J. VAN DEN BERG, novembre 2006. 
 
2006–33  Knowledge sourcing and firm performance in an industrializing economy  : the case of 
Taiwan in the 1990s. 
  Chia–Lin CHANG, Stéphane ROBIN, novembre 2006. 
 
2006–34  Using the Asymptotically Ideal Model to estimate the impact of knowledge on labour 
productivity : An application to Taiwan in the 1990s. 
  Chia–Lin CHANG, Stéphane ROBIN, novembre 2006. 
 
2006–35  La politique budgétaire dans la nouvelle macroéconomie internationale. 
  Gilbert KOENIG, Irem ZEYNELOGLU, décembre 2006. 
 
2006–36  Age Dynamics and Economic Growth : Revisiting the Nexus in a Nonparametric Setting.   
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Tapas MISHRA, décembre 2006. 
 
2007–01  Transparence et efficacité de la politique monétaire. 
  Romain BAERISWYL, Camille CORNAND, janvier 2007. 
 
2007–02   Crowding–out in Productive and Redistributive Rent–Seeking. 
  Giuseppe DARI–MATTIACCI, Éric LANGLAIS, Bruno LOVAT, Francesco PARISI, janvier 
2007. 
 
2007–03  Co–résidence chez les parents et indemnisation des jeunes chômeurs en Europe. 
  Olivia ÉKERT–JAFFÉ, Isabelle TERRAZ, janvier 2007. 
 
2007–04  Labor Conflicts and Inefficiency of Relationship–Specific Investments : What is the Judge’s 
Role ? 
  Bruno DEFFAINS, Yannick GABUTHY, Eve–Angéline LAMBERT, janvier 2007. 
 
2007–05  Monetary hyperinflations, speculative hyperinflations and modelling the use of money. 




La présente liste ne comprend que les Documents de Travail publiés à partir du 1
er janvier 2000. La liste 
complète peut être donnée sur demande. 
This list contains the Working Paper writen after January 2000, 1rst. The complet list is available upon 
request. 
 
 
 
_____ 